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NOTES
THE LAW OF CRIMINAL ABORTION: AN ANALYSIS OF
PROPOSED REFORMS
Since the turn of the century, existing abortion laws have been the
object of criticism by both legal and social reformers.1 In all United
States jurisdictions it is a crime to induce an abortion, unless the case
falls within certain exceptions ;2 yet the number of these illegal operations
has assumed monstrous proportions' and, in all but an insignificant num-
ber of cases, go unprosecuted.4 A heterogeneous array of solutions to
this problem of non-enforcement has been proposed; but the law, with
a few exceptions, has not been modified. In attempting to explain this
apparent legislative apathy toward a problem of such magnitude, it seems
essential to re-examine the underlying rationale of the abortion laws.
Any proposal, regardless how superficially attractive, which conflicts
with the basic purpose of the law which it purports to reform is clearly
undesirable, unless it can be further demonstrated that the purpose is one
which society no longer desires to be effectuated. Thus, the value of
any particular solution can best be determined by the utilization of a
standard evolved from this underlying rationale.
Although the practice of abortion goes back to earliest recorded
history,' its emergence as a crime is a comparatively recent development.
In many societies the laws against abortion reflect a desire to foster
population growth.' Both Plato and Aristotle, on the other hand, recoin-
1. STORER & HEARD, CRIlINAL ABORTION (1868); ROSEN, THERAPEUTIC ABORTION
(1954); TAUsSIG, ABORTION, SPONTANEOUS AND INDUCED (1936) (hereinafter cited as
TAUSSIG) ; TAYLOR, THE ABORTION PROBLEM (1944).
2. See note 59 infra.
3. The only official statistics found in the United States Census publications are
for number of reported fetal deaths after twenty weeks gestation. The figure for 1951
was 70,569 which excludes the first twelve weeks gestation during which the majority
of abortions are performed and further excludes illegal abortions; it clearly gives no
accurate picture of the scope of the problem. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS CUmNT
POPULATION REPORTS (Series P-25, No. 118) (1953). Taussig in his classic work on
abortion, makes the ultra-conservative estimate of 681,000 abortions based on a natural
population of 120,000,000. He arrived at this figure on the basis of one abortion for every
2.5 confinements in urban areas and 1 to 5 in rural areas. A projection of these estimates
based on present population figures would indicate a total of more than 1,171,000 abortions
in 1953 (60% to 65% estimated to be illegal). TAUSSIG 25.
4. It has been estimated that convictions number less than one thousand per year.
ROSEN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 6. The only recent official tabulations are to be found in
the Attorney General and Judicial Council reports of a few states: Connecticut (1938-
1954), 135 prosecutions, 118 convictions; Minnesota (1938-1953), 119 prosecutions,
114 convictions; Utah (1938-1954), 7 prosecutions, 7 convictions.
5. The oldest abortifacient recipe still extant in writing is attributed to an ancient
medical work written during the reign of Emperor Shen Nung who according to Chinese
chronology reigned from 2737 B.C. to 2696 B.C. TAussIG 35.
6. This was especially true for the Jews. In Genesis, ch 1, 22, we find the command
"Be fruitful and multiply," and later on the promise "that in blessing I will bless thee,
and in multiplying I will multiply thy seeds as the stars of the heaven, and as the sand
which is upon the sea shore," GENESIS, ch xxii, 17. Hale cites EXODUS, ch xxi, 22, for the
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mended abortion, especially in the first half of pregnancy, as a method
of limiting population.7 In Rome, during the Pagan Empire, abortion
seems to have received only mild social disapproval,8 but with the advent
of the early Christian Emperors came the first unqualified condemna-
tion of the practice in the Western World.9 The Christian Church estab-
lished abortion as a crime against the unborn fetus, which was regarded
as having a soul, and the penalty was death."0 Voltaire, Rousseau, and
other reformers succeeded in obtaining the abolition of such an extreme
penalty, but it must be noted that this was accomplished more through
arousing the tide of public opinion against the barbarity of the sanction
than through any change in the moral concepts underlying the law."
The exact status of abortion in the English law prior to the passage
of the first abortion statute in 180312 is confused. There is no doubt
that abortion was an ecclesiastical offense as late as 1527," but there is
no conclusive evidence that it was ever a crime at common law.'4 Abor-
proposition that according to the judicial law of Moses, abortion was punishable by death.
1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 433 (1736).
7. The Greeks seem to have had a true Malthusian philosophy which is reflected
in their views as to both infanticide and fetacide. See 1 WESTERMARCK, ORIGIN AND
DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL IDEAS 415 (1906) ; TAUSSIG 33.
8. 1 WESTERMARCK, op. cit. supra note 7, at 415.
9. 6 ELLIS, STUDIES IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX 604 (1940).
10. Id. at 605.
11. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 370 (1930). The Christian Church ap-
parently adopted the attitude of the Jews toward abortion. 2 LECKY, HISTORY OF
EUROPEAN MORALS 23 (1884). St. Augustine is credited with initiating the distinction
between an embryo as yet unformed, embryo informatus, and the animate fetus, embryo
formatus. A fetus in this latter stage of pregnancy was thought to be endowed with
an immortal soul which was in need of baptism for its salvation, and its destruction was
therefore considered murder. WESTERMARCK, op. cit. supra note 7, at 416-17. This
distinction was later incorporated into both English and American law. See note 23 infra.
12. See note 15 infra.
13. The earliest Anglo-Saxon reference to abortion is found in the Penitential
of Theodore, Archbishop of Canterbury, 668-90 A.D., which provides that women who
commit abortion after the fetus "has life" should do penance as murderesses. McNErLL
& GAMER, MEDIEVAL HANDBOOK OF PENANCE 197 (1938). One of the last ecclesiastical
references is the following note dated 1527 found in Archdeacon Hale's Procedents:
"Margareta Saunders notatur quod potionibus infantulum in utero Johanne Byrde
interemit . . ." HALE, PRECEDENTS AND PROCEEDINGS IN CRIMINAL CAUSES, 1475-1640,
under date 1527 (1847).
14. Bracton is the first treatise writer to refer to abortion, but his entire discourse
on homicide is derived either directly or at second hand from Bernard of Pavia, a
cannonist of the late twelfth and early thirteenth century. MAITLAND, SELECTED PASSAGES
FROM BRACTON AND Azo 225 (8 Seldon Society 1894). Maitland says that when Bracton
dealt with matters which came before English courts he used English cases, and that it
was only when there were no cases and when he was dealing with a question which was
speculative or academic that he went outside the realm for his authority. Id. at xx.
Fleta, who quoted and abridged Bracton, is translated by Storer as follows: "Moreover,
whoever shall have overlain a pregnant woman, or who shall have given her drugs or
blows, in such a sort as to procure abortion, or non-conception after the fetus shall have
been already formed and endowed with life, is by law, a homicide." STORER & HEARD,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 152. Coke, who quoted both Bracton and Fleta, regarded abortion
NOTES
tion, according to the terms of 43 George III, c.58 (1803) was punishable
by death if the woman was "quick with child," and by transportation or
imprisonment if performed prior to quickening.15 This statutory adop-
tion of the ecclesiastical distinction based on quickening is good evidence
that Parliament continued to regard abortion as a crime against the un-
born child."8
Although historical study strongly indicates that abortion was con-
sidered a moral question in England, it must not be assumed that our
modern legislation is always predicated solely on a desire to protect the
fetus. Increased medical knowledge has made both legislatures and
court aware of possible deleterious effects on the mother's health result-
ing from artificially induced abortion." Thus, protection of the mother's
health has, on occasion, been a salient factor controlling judicial interpre-
tation of the rationale of an abortion statute. 8 Protection of the mother's
as "a great misprison and no murder," but he cites no authority or cases for this change.
3 COKE, INSTITUTES *50. Hale, Hawkins, and Blackstone all adopt the view of Coke.
I HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 433 (1736) ; 1 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 94 (1824
ed.) ; 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129. Whether abortion continued to be an offense
of ecclesiastical cognizance until 1803 is doubtful in view of the fact that no mention of it
is made in Burns, Ecclesiastical Laws (4 vols. 2d ed.) published in 1767. The status of
the ecclesiastical law after the English Reformation rested on 25 HENRY 8, c. 19, which
affirmed the authority of all canon law not already covered by the "laws, statutes, and
customs of the real." See MORTIMER, WESTERN CANON LAW 61 (1953). Thus, it may
well be that the ecclesiastical courts had ceased to exercise jurisdiction over abortion
at about the same time Coke was writing his Institutes. Several writers have said that
abortion was exclusively a common law offense, but there appears no basis for this view
other than an unsupported generalization from the statements of the treatise writers.
See note 20 J. Crai. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 595 (1938) ; Note, 35 COLUm. L. Rav. 87 n.2
(1935).
15. 1 VICTORIA C. 58 (1837) modified 43 GEORGE 3 c. 58 (1803) by eliminating
the "quick with child" distinction and reducing the penalty to transportation or imprison-
ment. This act as slightly modified by the OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON AcT of 1861,
24 & 25 VICTORIA c. 100, 558, and further modified by judicial interpretation is the law
of England today.
16. The preamble to this act which stated that "certain . . . heinous offenses,
committee with intent to destroy the lives of his Majesty's Subjects by Poison, or with
Intent to procure the miscarriage of Women . . . have been of late also frenquently
committed; but no adequate Means have been hitherto provided for the Prevention and
Punishment of such offenses," lends support to the contention that abortion was primarily
an ecclesiastical offense prior to passage of the act. Davies, The Law of Abortion and
Necessity, 2 MODERN L. REv. 126, 134 (1938).
17. Fatal hemorrhage may follow cutterage by an unskilled abortionist, and an
even more frequent complication is that of infection resulting from failure to perform the
operation under aseptic conditions. See Fisher, Crintinal Abortion, 42 3. CRim. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 242, 247 (1951) ; GONZALES, LEGAL MEDICINE 567 (2d ed. 1954).
18. State v. Cooper, 22 NJ.L. 52 (Sup. Ct. 1849) decided that at common law
abortion was not a crime prior to quickening. As a result of this decision the New
Jersey legislature inacted a statute which purported to eliminate any distinction based
on quickening. This statute was construed in State v. Murphy, 27 N.J.L. 112 (Sup. Ct.
1858) where the court, after commenting that at common law abortion was only an
offense against the life of the child, Went on to say: "The design of the statute was not
to prevent the procuring of abortions, so much as to guard the health and life of the
mother against the consequences of such attempts." Id. at 114. But at least one section
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health has most frequently been urged in conjunction with the more fun-
damental concept of abortion as a crime against the unborn child. The
courts have felt particularly obliged to articulate a rationale in cases
where the death of the fetus prior to the acts of the defendant has been
raised as a defense.1" In jurisdictions where the defendant has been held
guilty under these circumstances the courts have characterized the statute
as having a dual function.2" Unfortunately, abortion statutes have failed
to live up to expectations and, in fact, have had an adverse effect on the
mother's health. Although the statute may on occasion act as a deterrent
to the would-be abortionist, the more usual effect is merely to drive him
underground. The operation is often performed incompetently and
under unsanitary conditions. Even more serious is the fact that patients
rarely receive the proper post operative care following one of these clan-
destine operations.2 The Russian experiment in legalized abortion has
demonstrated that an abortion performed under optimum conditions pre-
sents very little risk to the patient.22
of the New Jersey law is still aimed at protection of the fetus, since by the terms of
the 1881 revision the maximum penalty is doubled if the child dies. N.J. REv. STAT. §
2A:87-1 (1951). For an example of a statute rationalized as exclusively for the pro-
tection of the fetus, see Miller v. Bennet, 190 Va. 162, 168, 56 S.E.2d 217, 221 (1949).
19. In the several states which have held the death of the fetus prior to the abortion
as a good defense, the statute seems chiefly intended for the protection of the life of the
fetus. Tonnahill v. State, 84 Tex. Crim. 517, 208 S.W. 516 (1919); Taylor v. State,
105 Ga. 846, 33 S.E. 190 (1899) ; State v. Atwood, 54 Or. 526, 102 Pac. 295 (1909), aff'd,
54 Or. 542, 104 Pac. 195 (1909) ; State v. Howard 32 Vt. *380, *398 (1859) (dictum).
20. Thus, in State v. Tippie, 89 Ohio St. 35, 105 N.E. 75 (1913) where it was held
that the statute had abrogated the common law, the court said, "This statute regards
not only the life of the child, but also the life of the woman, though she be not with
child in fact." Id. at 37, 105 N.E. at 77. Other courts have observed, "The life and
health of the mother, and the probability of future off-springs are all so seriously put
at hazard by such a transaction, when produced by mechanical means, that it is not
easy to determine precisely which is the more important purpose of the statute, to prevent
the injury to the child or to the mother." State v. Howard, supra note 19, at *399.
"The intention of the lawmakers was to protect the health and lives of pregnant
women . . . and their unborn children from those who intentionally and not in good
faith would thwart nature by performing or causing abortion and miscarriage." Ander-
son v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 665, 668, 58 S.E.2d 72, 75 (1950). "It is entirely
immaterial that the fetus previous to the acts of the appellant had lost its vitality so that
it could not mature into a living child. The statute defining abortion is designed to
protect the life of the mother as well as that of her child." State v. Cox, 197 Wash.
67, 77, 84 P.2d 357, 361 (1938).
21. Lack of space and the everpresent risk of detection forces the criminal abor-
tionist to require patients to leave his office as soon as possible after the operation,
often within thirty minutes. Contrasted to this is the five to ten days rest period deemed
absolutely essential by the legitimate practitioner. See Bates, The Abortion 1ill: Al
In-sttutional Study, 45 J. CRIMi. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 157, 161; TAUSSIG 171.
22. The Soviet law which was passed in 1922 and repealed in 1936 provided:
1) Primigravidal are not aborted except for medical complications unless, after
careful explanation of the dangers, they insist upon its being done.
2) No abortion is done in the first three months of pregnancy (twelve weeks after
last menstruation).
3) No abortion is done earlier than six months following a preceding abortion.
NOTES
The modern statutory abrogation of the quick-with-child distinction
appears to have resulted from medical acceptance of the view always
maintained by the early Christian Church that the child from the moment
of conception has a separate existence.23 A more fundamental modifica-
tion raising problems of rationale is the holding in several jurisdictions
that proof of pregnancy is not essential to a conviction for abortion, 4
but even in most of these states the object of protecting the fetus is still
evidenced by the existence of a separate statute providing for a more
severe penalty if the fetus dies.25 In other jurisdictions this modification
was apparently made as a means of obtaining stricter enforcement,2 and
in only two states does the exclusion of pregnancy as an essential element
indicate a possible rejection of protection of the fetus as a rationale."'
Another type of rationale which has received limited judicial ac-
ceptance is the view that abortion statutes are designed primarily to pre-
vent interference with racial reproduction, but the argument here is not
founded on the population policies typically underlying suppression of
4) Women required to stay in the hospital for three days after the operation and
must not go to work for two weeks after. TAUSSIG 414. According to Taussig's figures,
the death rate was .01% as compared to 1.2% in the United States. Id. at 26.
23. See STORER & HEARD, op. cit. supra note 1, c. 1. In State v. Alcorn, 7 Idaho 599,
64 Pac. 1019 (1900), the court in holding that the crime may be committed prior to
quickening of the fetus made it clear that the law still regarded the protection of the
fetus: "The crime for which appellant has been convicted is one of the worst known
to the law. An unnatural abortion, brought about by means of drugs or instruments,
violates decency, the best interests of society, the divine law, the law of nature, the
criminal statutes of this state, and is not only destructive of life unborn, but places in
jeopardy the life of a human being-the pregnant woman." Id. at 599, 64 Pac. at 1019.
24. In some jurisdictions pregnancy has been expressly excluded as an element of
the offense, e.g., DEL. CODE AN. tit. 11 § 301 (1953) ; VT. STAT. § 8477 (1947). In other
jurisdictions where the statute does not specifically include pregnancy, it has been
excluded by judicial interpretation, e.g., Commonwealth v. Willard, 179 Pa. Super. 368,
116 A.2d 751 (1955). State v. Gallardo, 41 Cal.2d 57, 257 P.2d 292 (1953).
25. The Missouri statute is in two parts; one aimed at situations where the woman
is pregnant, but not quick with child, or not in fact pregnant, and the second part retaining
the "quick with child" distinction, making death of the fetus manslaughter. Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 559.100 (1949). See also N.Y. PEN. CODE § 294 and § 189; PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18 § 4718 and § 4719 (1930) ; FLA. STAT. § 797.02 and § 782.10 (1955).
26. In State v. Magnell, 19 De. 307, 51 Atl. 606 (1901), the court, in construing
a statute which used the language "woman pregnant or supposed by the accused to be
pregnant," remarked that the general assembly had passed the statute in the belief that
the prevelence of the practice called for "stringent provisions for its rigid suppression
enforced by severe punishment. . . ." Id. at 309, 51 Atl. at 607.
27. In Vermont, the statute has been rationalized as having a dual function. State
v. Howard, 32 Vt. 380 (1859). In Indiana, the provision that the woman need not be
pregnant only applies where the woman dies. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-105 (1955). In Iowa
and Massachusetts, the courts have followed the English rule that pregnancy is not an
element without any attempt to rationalize. State v. Snyder, 188 Iowa 1150, 177 N.W.
77 (1920) ; Commonwealth v. Taylor, 132 Mass. 261 (1882) ; Reg. v. Goodchild, 2 Car.
& K. 293, 175 Eng. Rep. 121 (K.B. 1858).
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abortion on the continent in recent years. 8 The American courts appear
to regard interference with propagation not objectionable on nationalistic
grounds, but, rather, as a moral question involving a crime against na-
ture. 9 A few courts have noted with approval that abortion laws not
only protect the fetus, but act as a bulwark against loose morals among
the unmarried."0 This argument, however, loses much of its force in
consideration of the fact that the majority of abortions are performed
on married women. 1
The foregoing analysis would seem to indicate that the ecclesiastical
view of abortion as a crime against the fetus continues to be the under-
lying rationale of contemporary abortion statutes. Although the law
now seeks to protect other interests, such as the health of the mother, the
basic theme of protection of the fetus is not only retained through spe-
cific statutory provisions, but is frequently reiterated by the courts which
enforce the statutes. Therefore, it is erroneous to attack abortion laws
on the grounds that they fail to accomplish some purpose such as the pro-
tection of population growth or the mother's health, since even if these
contentions are true the moral rationale will continue to exist regardless
of ethical validity until such time as the mores of the community undergo
a change.3
2
28. In both France and Belgium the penalties for abortion were reduced in the hope
that ineffectiveness of the law resulted from excessive severity of the penalty. The
desire for stricter enforcement arose out of widespread concern for the falling birth
rate. Implementation of population policies was also deemed to require increased supres-
sion of contraceptives. It is of note that the ban on dissemination of birth control
devices appears to be responsible for even greater disregard of abortion laws. Glass,
The Effectiveness of Abortion Legislation in Six Countries, 2 MODERN L. REV. 97, 108
(1938).
29. "It is a flagrant crime . . . because it interfers with and violates the mysteries
of nature, in that process by which the human race is propagated and continued. It is
a crime against nature which abstructs the fountain of life, and is therefore punishable."
Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa. *631, *633 (1850). Accord, Dykes v. State, 30 Ala.
App. 129, 1 So.2d 754 (1941) ; People v. Gallardo, 41 Cal.2d 57, 243 P.2d 532 (1952).
30. "The reason and policy of the statute is to protect women and unborn babes
from dangerous criminal practice, and to discourage secret immortality between the
sexes . . ." State v. Tippie, 89 Ohio St. 35, 40, 105 N.E. 75, 77 (1913). Accord, State
v. Atwood, 54 Or. 526, 102 Pac. 295 (1909) ; State v. Howard, 32 Vt. *380 (1859).
31. It is a popular misconception that abortion is intrinsically linked with illegitimacy.
In most statistical studies of abortion married women have outnumbered the unmarried,
widowed, and divorced combined, and Taussig estimates that 90% of all illegal abortions
are performed on married women. TAUSSIG 376. See also HAMILTON, Some SocIoLOGIc
AND PSYCHOLOGIC OBSERVATIONS ON ABORTION (1940); SIMONS, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
OF ONE THOUSAND ABORTIONS (1939).
32. Professor Hall points out that the criminologist must concern himself "with
empirical study of moral ideas. If moral ideas are viewed as facts which operate in
reactions against persons and conduct deemed anti-social, then the ethical validity of
such ideas is of no consequence so far as criminologic research is concerned. They
must be accepted without bias as elements in the factual setup with which the scientist
must deal, however superficial or distasteful they may be." Thus program or reform
which ignore these moral ideas are "largely irrelevant. The briefest study of history-
NOTES
Determination of this underlying rationale is of more than academic
interest. To the contrary, it has great utility in that it provides a standard
by which we may evaluate tentative solutions to the abortion problem.
Thus, every hypothetical solution must be reconciled with the basic pur-
pose of protecting the life of the unborn child.3 No solution which ig-
nores this premise, however effectively it may deal with the immediate
problem of non-enforcement, is acceptable.
One of the most formidable obstacles to effective enforcement of
abortion laws lies in the very nature of the crime. Everyone connected
with the operation is naturally interested in suppressing knowledge from
the police, and there is no injured party in the usual sense of the word
to file a complaint. For this reason abortions are rarely detected unless
the woman dies. 4 In cases where a woman seeks treatment of injuries
received as the result of an illegal abortion, the physician's legal and ethi-
cal position is uncertain. A New York City ordinance requires the doc-
tor to report all cases of abortion regardless of their nature,3 5 but the
physicians in most jurisdictions are under no such legal obligation.3
Whether or not medical etiquette requires a physician who knows his
patient has had an illegal abortion to keep the confidence of his patient
is still a hotly debated point.3
The enormous discrepancy between the incidence of illegal abortion
and number of prosecutions indicates the existence of a more fundamen-
certainly that of law-shows an amazing inertia, an astounding persistence of patterns
of thought that cannot be ignored by scientists. To say that a proposed code must be
practicable, that its chances for adoption must be good, is to put the matter superficially.
It is the business of the social scientist to ground his discovery in fact. Correct norms
cannot be spun from air. . . ." Hall, Criminology and A Modern Penal Code, 27 J.
Cim!. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 11-13 (1936).
33. Note that in -the case of the therapeutic exception this reconciliation has
historically taken the form of subordination of the interest in protecting the fetus to the
interest in saving the mother's life. See note 59 infra.
34. In non-fatal abortion cases it is generally impossible to obtain a conviction
without the testimony of an eye witness. Fisher, Criminal Abortion, 42 J. CRIm. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 242, 248. Gonzales notes that prosecutors frequently experience difficulty
even in establishing that the woman was pregnant in fatal cases. GONZALES, op. cit. s pra
note 17, at 570.
35. Id. at 566.
36. At common law any person who knew of the commission of a felony and took
no steps to bring the felon to justice was guilty of "misprison felony," but this offense
is probably obsolete. Coxr, INSTITUTEs *139; 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAWs § 289
(12th ed. 1932).
37. The duty of the physician to contact police officials in situations where the
woman is dying so that she may have an opportunity to make a dying declaration
admissible as evidence in a court of law, is generally conceded. 138 L.T. 194; Fisher,
Crminal Abortion, 42 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 249 (1951). The difficult
question arises where the woman will recover, and in these situations the doctor is
probably governed more by expediency and conscience than by fiat. GONzALES, op. cit.
nipra note 17, at 566.
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tal reason for non-enforcement than mere difficulties of detection and
evidence. One possible explanation is that the severity of the sanction
renders the law ineffective."8 Professor Jerome Hall has pointed out
that the discretion exercised by 18th century English juries in mitigation
of the capital sanction has been taken over largely by the prosecutor, the
typical method being waiver of the felony."9 This device does not appear
to be utilized extensively in the abortion situation for two reasons:
1) the prosecutor is usually reluctant to reduce the charge in crimes to
which any considerable moral stigma attaches,4" and 2) the general apathy
of public and police officials toward the crime precludes the vast ma-
jority of illegal abortions from ever coming to the attention of the prose-
cutor."' One writer in commenting on this latter aspect of the non-
enforcement problem argues that the only valid estimate of public opinion
is the record of public behavior. Hence, widespread violation of a law
indicates that the illegal conduct is "secretly" approved by the com-
munity.42 It seems dangerous so completely to equate behavior with
mores, for the legal reformer who does so may suddenly find himself
unable to convert the so-called real convictions of the people into legisla-
tive conviction. Perhaps abortion laws are part of that body of law, the
continued existence of which is required by the community as a symbol
of formal public disapproval of behavior that in specific instances may
be condoned.
Three basic avenues of attack on the problem of non-enforcement
have been proposed: statutory reform, stricter enforcement of existing
statutes, and the elimination of reasons for procuring an abortion. The
latter solution embraces proposals for legalizing distribution of contra-
ceptive devices, dissemination of information regarding their use, and
the more fundamental solution of alleviating the indigent economic con-
dition of those classes in which the practice of abortion is most preva-
lent. Statistics indicate that the majority of abortions are performed on
married women 3 who seek to avoid the economic burden of another
38. See note 28 supra.
39. ". . . the police magistrate and the prosecuting attorney loom up as by far
the most powerful officials in our system of criminal justice. Examination of their
work reveals a practice so frequent, typical, and significant, that it has become vastly
important, namely, waiver of the major felony charge and acceptance of a plea of
guilty to a lesser offense." HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCIETY 144 (2d ed. 1952).
40. Id. at 144 n. 80.
41. Amen, Some Obstacles to Effective Legal Control of Criminal Abortion, in
THE ABORTION PROBLEM 133, 135 (Tayor ed. 1944).
42. 1 ENcYcLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 376 (1930).
43. See note 31 supra.
200
NOTES
child,44 and several European countries have attempted to meet this prob-
lem by paying a subsidy to the parents for each birth.45 The logic of
those who advocate birth control as a solution to the abortion problem is
unimpeachable, but again there are certain practical objections. It must
be noted that although many states have statutes prohibiting the sale or
use of contraceptives,4" in only two states is there any attempt at enforce-
ment,"7 and the inconvenience of most contraceptives is probably a greater
deterrent to their use than is any legal impediment.48  Regardless of the
practical disadvantages, the economic aid and birth control proposals are
acceptable on the basis of the standard which has been proposed. It is
often assumed that identical obstacles impede the reform of birth control
and abortion laws, but this is true only to the extent that both involve a
violation of moral taboos. The specific harm involved is quite different,
for it cannot be said that birth control conflicts with the abortion law
rationale of protection of an unborn child.
One avenue of statutory reform would involve either unconditional
repeal or, what would be tantamount to repeal, an enlargement of legal
exception to include economic necessity.4" The advocates of this course
are armed with a diversified collection of arguments. One writer, after
44. This has been born out by two studies which correlated the proportion of
illegal abortoins according to pregnancy order. In each study the data for the series were
limited to pregnancies within marriage. In New York City there were 5.2 abortions per
100 first pregnancies and 43.3 per 100 fifth pregnancies. In an Indianapolis study the
corresponding figures were .4 per 100 first pregnancies and 17.9 per 100 fifth pregnancies.
FOETAL, INFANT AND EARLY CHILDHOOD MORALITY, 13 United Nations Population
Studies Vol. 1, pp. 25, 26 (Dept. Social Affairs, Population Division, U.N. 1954). The
inference from these figures is that economic distress caused by large families is a
controlling factor in the incidence of illegal abortions.
45. Tax exemptions are another method of achieving this same result. See TAUSSiG
395. Such proposals, although perhaps theoretically sound, involve political and social
considerations outside the scope of this note.
46. See Note, 45 HARv. L. Rxv. 723 (1923) for a comprehensive collection of these
statutes and cases.
47. Only Mass. and Conn. still attempt to make any effort at enforcement. PILPEL
& ZAVIN, YOUR MARRIAGE AND THE LAW 173 (1952). However, in the former a convic-
tion cannot be sustained unless the article was sold or used for the sole purpose of
contraception. Ibid. Some states attempt to channel the distribution of devices and
information for contraception through legitimate drug stores and physicians. They
also require state testing procedures intended to insure at least a minimum quality of
the product. See e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-801-10 (1955).
48. GAIL, SEX AND THE LAW 202 (1935). Seven southern states go so far as to
promulgate birth control information through their public health departments to anyone
who desires it. (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Virginia) PILPEL & ZAviN, op. cit. mspra note 47, at 167. Information is
also distributed on a national basis by such agencies as the Human Betterment Associa-
tion of America.
49. The argument here is that any legislative exception invites evasion by the
unscrupulous. See Note, 35 COLUm. L. RFv. 85, n. 46 (1935). But if economic distress
is the principle cause of abortion, then an exception for economic necessity would
render abortion laws largely nugatory even in the absence of deliberate evasion.
201
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
comparing the value of the fetus and the adult on the basis of life ex-
pectancy, concluded that the fetus is merely "a parasite performing no
function whatever."5  Another argues that the right of society to pro-
vide for the termination of fetal life is ethically in line with the right to
terminate the lives of those individuals whose anti-social conduct makes
them dangerous.51 Legalized abortion was urged strongly by those in-
volved in the feminist movement in Germany at the turn of the century.
It was their contention that the right to terminate fetal life existed by
virtue of the woman's right of control over her own body. Exercise of
this right without good cause was supposedly precluded by the natural
force of mother love." The most persuasive practical argument for
legalized abortion is the deleterious effect which illegally induced abor-
tions frequently have on the mother's health. 3
The practical arguments against repeal or exception for economic
necessity are not without merit. The argument that repeal would greatly
reduce mortality and morbidity rates is chiefly supported by the Russian
experience,54 but opponents of legalized abortion point out that the Soviet
experiment was far from being a complete success. Shortly before vir-
tually unrestricted legal abortion was repealed in 1936, medical centers be-
gan to report a large incidence of delayed medical complications or "late
effects." This was especially prevalent among women who had aborted
in their first pregnancy.5 Unfortunately, the Soviet experiment did not
last long enough to determine whether these "late effects" might be pre-
vented by utilization of more advanced techniques, but certainly grave
doubts are raised as to the wisdom of proposing legalized abortion as the
panacea for the United States abortion problem. The considerations
weighing against a legal exception for economic necessity include the in-
herent administrative difficulties, and the probability that such an excep-
tion would offer an easy avenue of escape for all offenders.5" For our
purposes, however, these practical and ethical polemics are irrelevant.
Legalized abortion clearly fails to fulfill the minimum requirements for
a feasible solution as defined by the standard previously discussed; in
50. BALLANTYNE, MANUAL OF ANTENATAL PATHOLOGY: THE FETUS 459 (1921).
51. 6 ELLIS, STUDIES IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX 606 (1940).
52. Id. at 607-8.
53. See note 17 supra. A variation on this theme is the argument that the social
stigma attached to illegitimacy makes it desirable to legalize abortion for unwed mothers.
1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 372 (1930).
54. See note 22 supra.
55. Confinements following a legalized abortion had a higher incidence of such
complications as long labours, postpartum bleeding, and adherent placenta. Menstrual
disturbances, pelvic disturbances, sterility, and functional neuroses such as hysteria,
depression, and loss of libido were also traced to a prior abortion. TAUSSIG 415.
56. See note 47 supra.
NOTES
fact, no proposal is more palpably the antithesis of protection of the
fetus! As long as abortion laws reflect a basic moral attitude of the
community, repeal or reform tantamount to repeal is both impractical
and undesirable.5 7
One aspect of statutory reform which remains to be discussed is the
therapeutic exception.58 Induced abortion to "save" or "preserve" the
life of the mother is expressly allowed in the abortion laws of 31 states,59
and seven additional states allow the exception to save life only if the
operation is medically advised.6" The desirability of such an exception
has been almost universally conceded,61 the usual criticism being that it
is too narrow.62 The famous English case of Rex v. Bourne emphasized
the inadequacy of the narrow "save life" exception found in most United
States jurisdictions. Although the English statute has no express ex-
ception to "save life," the word "unlawfully" as used in the statute had
prior to the Bourne case been interpreted to mean that an abortion in-
duced to save or preserve the life of the mother was not illegal.6" The
defendant physician in the Bourne Case successfully contended that the
57. See note 32 supra.
58. Taussig defines the therapeutic abortion as "Interruption of pregnancy before
viability in order to conserve the life or health of the mother." TAUsSIG 480.
59. ARIz. CODE ANN. § 43-301 (1939); CAL. PEN. CODE § 274 (Deering 1949);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8363 (1949); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 301 (1953) ; IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 18-601 (1948); ILL. REV. STAT. c. 38, § 3 (1955); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-105
(1955); IOWA CODE ANN. § 701, 1 (1950) ; Ky. REv. STAT. § 436.020 (Supp. 1956) ;
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. c. 134, § 9 (1954); MICH. Comp. LAWS § 750.14 (1948); MINN.
STAT. § 617.18 (1953) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 2223 (Supp. 1954) ; MONT. REv. CODES ANN.
§ 94-401 (1947) ; NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-405 (1956) ; NEv. Comp. LAWS § 10129 (1929) ;
N.H. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 585:13 (1955); N.Y. PEN. CODE § 294; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-44
(1953) ; N.D. REv. CODE § 12-2501 (1943) ; OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 861 (1951) ; R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. c. 606, § 22 (1938) ; S.C. CODE § 16-82 (1952) ; S.D. CODE § 13.3101 (1939) ;
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-301 (1935) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2 (1953) ; VT. STAT. § 8477
(1947); VA. CODE ANN. § 18-64 (1950); WASH. REv. CODE § 4.02.010 (Supp. 1950);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5923 (1955); Wyo. Co ap. STAT. ANN. § 4-223 (1955).
60. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2224 (1947); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1101 (1953); KAN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-410 (1949) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.000 (1949) ; OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2910.16 (Page 1954) ; TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1183 (1948); WIs. STAT. §
340.095 (1955).
61. The Catholic Church takes the position that an abortion should not be performed
under any circumstances. Huser, The Meaning of "Fetus" In Relation to the Crime of
Abortion, 8 JuRIST 306 (1948). Given a choice of the death of the mother or the death
of the fetus, the Catholic Church defers the choice to nature. Despite this absolute
prohibition, studies indicate that there is little difference in the incidence of criminal
abortion among Catholics, Protestants, and Jews. TAYLOR, THE ABORTION PROBLEM
117 (1944); TAUSSi 399; Kopp, BIRTH CONTROL IN PRACTICE 78 (1934); ROBINSON,
SEVENTY BIRTH CONTROL CLINICS 34 (1930).
62. 186 L.T. 87 (1938) ; Davis, The Law of Abortion and Necessity, 2 MODERN
L. REv. 126 (1838).
63. The paucity of legal authority was one of the unique aspects of the Bourne case.
Although the legality of an abortion performed to save the life of the mother was
admitted by the prosecution, there was no case authority for this proposition offered
by either side. Davies, supra note 62, at 130.
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abortion, which he had performed to preserve the physical and mental
health of a 15 year old girl whose pregnancy had resulted from rape,
should be no less justified than an abortion induced where the mother's
life is in imminent danger. 4
Five jurisdictions in the United States have statutes which fail to
expressly recognize an exception to save life."5 In three of these, no case
on point has been reported, but in one, New Jersey, it has been held that
the statutory expression "without lawful justification" implies an excep-
tion to save life.66 In Massachusetts it has been held that the use of the
word "unlawfully" in the statute implies an exception to save life or
preserve health of the mother.6" Iowa is the only other jurisdiction to
expand the therapeutic exception by judicial interpretation to include
preserving health,6" but there the statute provided an express exception
to save life.6" In the statutes of four states and the District of Columbia
there is an express exception to save life or preserve health if medically
advised."0
64. Judge Macnaughten gave the following charge to the jury: "You have heard
a great deal of discussion of the difference between danger to life and danger to health.
I confess I have had great difficulty in understanding what the discussion really meant.
Life depends on health and it may be that if health is gravely impaired death re-
sults. . . . If pregnancy is likely to make the woman a physical or mental wreck you
are quite entitled to take the view that a doctor who, in these circumstances and led
by his belief, operates, is operating for the purpose of preserving the life of the
woman. . . . If the doctor in good faith thinks it necessary for the purpose of preserving
the life of the mother, in the sense that I have explained, not only is he intitled to perform
the operation, but it is his duty to do so." Id. at 128.
65. FLA. STAT. § 297.02 (1955); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87 (1950) ; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18 § 4718 (1930); N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:87-1 (1951); MASS. ANN. LAWS C.
272 § 19 (1956).
66. State v. Brandenburg, 137 N.J.L. 124, 58 A.2d 709 (1948).
67. "A physician may lawfully procure the abortion of a patient if in good faith he
believes it to be necessary to save her life or to prevent serious impairment of her health,
mental or physical, and if his judgment corresponds with the general opinion of competent
practitioners in the community in which he practices. Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 315
Mass. 394, 396, 53 N.E.2d 4, 5 (1944).
68. State v. Dunklebarger, 206 Iowa 971, 221 N.W. 592 (1928).
69. IowA CODE ANN. § 701.1 (1950).
70. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-23 (1953) ; MD. ANN CODE art. 27 § 3 (1951)
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-2 (1953); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22.201 (1951). In Oregon, the
last state to expand the therapeutic exception to include preserving health, the modifica-
tion was achieved by construing the provisions of the 1895 Criminal Act, ORE. REv. STAT.
§ 23.408 (1951), in conjunction with the 1951 Medical Practice Act, ORE. REv. STAT.
§ 54.901 et seq. 54.931, which provided that the board of medical examiners could revoke
a physician's license for "(b) The procuring or aiding or abetting in procuring an
abortion unless such is done for the relief of a woman whose health appears in peril
because of her pregnant condition after due consideration with another duly licensed
medical physician and surgeon." The court held that this provision of the Medical
Practice Act repealed the criminal abortion act as to physicians and surgeons, allowing
them to perform an abortion to preserve the health of the mother. State v. Buck, 200
Ore. 87, 262 P.2d 495 (1953).
ALA CODE ANN. tit. 14 § 9 (Supp. 1955) inlarges the "save life exception" to
include preserving health, but requires no medical consultation.
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An exception to preserve health, whether achieved by statutory re-
form or judicial interpretation, is clearly desirable. It is not only sound
from an ethical and medical viewpoint, but it is at the same time in keep-
ing with existing mores. The distinction between saving the mother's
life and preserving her health seems both tenuous and artificial. Not
only is it frequently difficult to ascertain what constitutes a peril to life
as opposed to impairment of health, but it is equally difficult to rational-
ize why one should be morally acceptable while the other is not. Thera-
peutic abortion as defined by the Bourne Case provides a flexible excep-
tion which can meet a variety of contingencies. With increasing knowl-
edge in the field of mental health, it is apparent that an exception to pre-
serve health would allow induced abortion for psychiatric indications as
well as for preservation of physical health. The much discussed rape
and insantity cases would thereby be provided for.
The high incidence of illegal abortion has had tragic consequences,
but, unfortunately, resort to the legislative process is not an automatic
panacea. Legal reforms which will immediately correct the evils of non-
enforcement are so antagonistic to the basic purpose of the law as to be
undesirable, while proposals such as expanded therapeutic exception,
which are consistent with the underlying rationale of the law, will ameli-
orate the situation only slightly. Prosecutors should avail themselves of
every opportunity to enforce existing laws, but success depends on the
co-operation of the public, a factor over which the prosecutor has no con-
trol. The ability of the legislature to deal with the problem is similarly
dependent on public opinion. The result of this anomalous situation is
that the status quo will remain undisturbed until either public opinion
becomes aroused sufficiently to enforce abortion laws, or existing mores
change enough to make legalized abortion a legislative feasibility.
PROCEDURAL TECHNIQUES FOR BELATED ATTACKS ON
JUDGMENTS IN INDIANA
It is one objective of our legal system to bring litigation to a timely
and final conclusion. However, correction of unjust decisions cannot be
completely subverted to the interest in finality. Some method must be
devised which permits the courts to balance the interest in finality and
that of correcting erroneous judgments. How great must be the hard-
ship before the law will sacrifice finality to prevent injustice? Several
factors must be weighed in making such a decision; the length of time
